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I. Jurisdiction 
The Utah Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the issues outlined in 
Archer's opening brief because Archer failed to appeal the Court of Appeals' denial of 
his Interlocutory Petition within the thirty-day period established under Utah law. 
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II. Statement of Issue 
Did the Court of Appeals properly determine that it lacked jurisdiction to consider 
Appellant's November 24, 2008 appeal? 
2 
III. Statement of the Case 
This case requires the Court to determine whether the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure permit an unsuccessful party to challenge the denial of a petition for 
interlocutory appeal of a judgment certified as final under Rule 54(b) until more than 
eighteen months later. The nature of the underlying case, for purposes of review on 
certiorari, is not contested. The only issue before this Court is whether jurisdiction 
remains in spite of Petitioner's failure to challenge the Rule 54(b) certification within the 
applicable appeals periods provided under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Because the entire question before the Court revolves around the procedural history of 
this case, the following statement of the procedural history is presented in an effort to 
provide context to that issue. 
1. Plaintiffs Dale D. Clark and Ruth E. Clark (collectively referred to as 
"Clark") filed their original Complaint on May 15, 2006. (R. at l.)1 The original 
Complaint was never served. On June 7, 2006, Clark filed a First Amended Complaint, 
which was then served on Defendant and Appellant Mark B. Archer ("Archer"). (R. at 
15.) 
2. The underlying case concerns approximately eight acres of real property 
located in Syracuse City known and referred to as the "Syracuse Meadows Property." On 
November 19, 1997, a warranty deed was recorded in Archer's favor, whereby Clark 
1. As noted infra, both original plaintiffs passed away during the pendency of the 
litigation, leaving James D. Clark, in his capacity as Personal Representative for the 
Estate of Dale D. Clark, as the plaintiff and respondent, and the term "Clark" should 
hereinafter be construed accordingly. 
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purportedly conveyed the Syracuse Meadows Property to Archer. (R. at 68.) Clark 
initiated the action against Archer in an effort to invalidate that deed and quiet title to the 
Syracuse Meadows Property in his favor. 
3. On October 9, 2006, Archer responded by filing an Answer that, in a single 
sentence, denied all allegations and asserted all affirmative defenses pursuant to Rule 8 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. at 81.) 
4. On December 8, 2006, Clark commenced discovery by propounding 
written discovery requests on Archer and co-defendants Bonneville Superior Title 
Company, Inc. and Bonneville Exchange, LLC. (R. at 103, 105.) On April 19, 2007, due 
to the advanced age of Plaintiff Dale Clark, Clark filed a Motion for Leave to Take Trial 
Deposition and Preserve Testimony of Dale D. Clark. (R. at 127.) 
5. On May 8, 2007, the district court entered a Stipulated Order Granting 
Motion to Preserve Trial Testimony of Plaintiff Dale D. Clark for All Purposes. (R. at 
252.) Pursuant to this Order, Mr. Clark's testimony was preserved by all counsel during 
a deposition that began on May 14, 2007, and lasted two days. 
6. On April 26, 2007, Clark filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
second and ninth causes of action of the amended complaint, which sought, alternatively, 
quiet title relief based on the failure of delivery of the warranty deed recorded and 
possessed by Archer, or pursuant to the doctrine of adverse possession. (R. at 161.) 
7. On May 14, 2007, Archer filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. (R. 
at 264.) 
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8. On September 24, 2007, the district court heard arguments on the cross-
motions for summary judgment. (R. at 354.) 
9. On October 15, 2007, the district court initially and as an interim ruling 
denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, but in doing so ordered 
supplemental briefing on the issue of whether Clark's failure of delivery claim, the 
second cause of action of the amended complaint, remained timely or had expired under 
the applicable statute of limitations. (R. at 356.) 
10. After supplemental briefing was submitted to the district court, the district 
court heard oral argument once again on January 28, 2008, regarding the cross-motions 
for summary judgment. At the conclusion of this hearing, the district court awarded 
summary judgment to Clark on his second cause of action, ruling that the statute of 
limitations had been tolled under Utah law and that there had been no legal and effective 
delivery of the deed under Utah law. (R. at 457.) 
11. Clark's counsel prepared a proposed form of judgment reflecting that ruling 
and, in accordance with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, circulated a draft of 
that judgment to all counsel for review. Archer opposed the proposed form of judgment 
and submitted an alternative form of judgment. (R. at 451.) 
12. On March 10, 2008, the district court convened a hearing for the sole 
purpose of clarifying the terms of the judgment. During this hearing, the trial court 
considered specifically whether the judgment would be certified as final and made the 
appropriate findings under Rule 54(b) regarding the lack of factual overlap in claims and 
the absence of just cause for delay in entering a final judgment. (R. at 456.) 
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13. The district court determined that Clark's proposed form of judgment 
accurately reflected its ruling and, accordingly, entered its Final Judgment on Plaintiffs' 
Second Cause of Action (the "Final Judgment") on March 10, 2008, and expressly 
certified it as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. at 
462-63.) 
14. On March 14, 2008, Clark's counsel, pursuant to Rule 58A(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, mailed to Archer's counsel a Notice of Entry of Final Judgment 
on Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action. (R. at 465.) 
15. Although the Final Judgment was expressly certified as final, was 
captioned as a final judgment, and Archer had received notice of its entry as a final 
judgment, Archer nevertheless requested permission, pursuant to Rule 5(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, to appeal the Final Judgment as though it were 
interlocutory by filing a Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order (the 
"Interlocutory Petition") in the Utah Supreme Court on March 31, 2008, twenty-one days 
after the date on which the Final Judgment was entered. (R. at 610.) 
16. Archer framed the "Question of Law" in his Interlocutory Petition as 
follows: 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44, does a statement (affidavit) by a party 
to an action referencing the tolling of an agreement, renew an alleged 
obligation or toll the statute of limitations when that statement is made in 
an affidavit after the statute of limitations has run without any evidence of 
intent to extend the obligation? 
(R. at 619.) 
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17. On April 4, 2008, the Utah Supreme Court transferred Archer's 
Interlocutory Petition to the Utah Court of Appeals for consideration. (R. at 482.) 
18. On April 15, 2008, Clark filed an Answer in Opposition to Petition for 
Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, arguing that Archer's Interlocutory Petition 
was improper in that it sought to appeal a judgment that had been specifically certified as 
final, and that any appeal of that judgment had to be filed pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which Archer had failed to do. (R. at 626.) 
19. The Utah Court of Appeals denied Archer's Interlocutory Petition on April 
25,2008. (R. at 483.) 
20. Archer did not appeal the denial of his Interlocutory Petition by seeking 
reconsideration or by filing a petition for certiorari. 
21. On May 19, 2008, Archer filed a Lis Pendens in the district court and 
recorded the same against the subject property. (R. at 485.) 
22. On July 2, 2008, Clark filed with the district court a Motion to Dismiss 
Remaining Claims and Release Lis Pendens. (R. at 488.) 
23. On July 17, 2008, Archer filed a Counterclaim and Crossclaim without first 
seeking leave of the district court to do so. (R. at 524.) On July 28, 2008, Clark filed a 
Motion to Strike Defendant Archer's Counterclaim. (R. at 548.) On August 6, 2008, 
Archer filed a Motion for Leave to File Crossclaim and Counterclaim. (R. at 567.) 
24. On September 23, 2008, the district court heard oral argument on all 
pending motions. At the conclusion of this hearing, the district court granted Clark's 
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motion to dismiss his remaining claims and to release the lis pendens, and denied 
Archer's motion for leave to file his Counterclaim and Crossclaim. (R. at 716.) 
25. On November 10, 2008, the district court entered an Order reflecting the 
various rulings made at the hearing on September 23, 2008. Id. 
26. On November 24, 2008, Archer filed a Notice of Filing Appeal with the 
Utah Supreme Court. (R. at 723.) The Notice of Filing Appeal expressly stated that 
"Mark B. Archer [a]ppeals to the Utah Supreme Court the Final Judgment and Order in 
this matter of the Honorable Thomas L. Kay of the Second Judicial District Court in an 
for Davis County signed on October 31, 2008 and entered on November 10, 2008 r Id. 
(emphasis added). The Notice of Filing Appeal made no mention of challenging any 
previous orders. On December 15, 2008, Archer filed a Docketing Statement, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
27. Archer's Docketing Statement specifically claimed as follows: "This appeal 
is NOT an appeal from an order in a multiple party or a multiple claim case in which the 
judgment has been certified as a final judgment by the trial court pursuant to Rule 54(b), 
Utah R. Civ. P." (Docketing Statement \ 5, at 2.) It was thus clear, both to the parties as 
well as the Court, that Archer was appealing the ruling contained in the November 10 
Order dismissing the remaining claims and ordering the removal of the lis pendens, and 
nothing else. 
28. Archer identified the following three issues in his Docketing Statement: 
Issue Number One: As a preliminary jurisdictional 
question, did the trial court err in finding that Appellee's 
claim under the Second Cause of Action, Failure of Delivery, 
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remained timely when Appellee failed to bring the cause of 
action for nine years after receiving notice that the claim was 
a valid cause of action? 
Id at 2. 
Issue Number Two: In the alternative, did the trial court err 
in granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment holding 
that Appellee had overcome the presumption of validity of a 
delivered deed when the only evidence presented to overcome 
the presumption was testimony of the grantor that he could 
not remember delivering the deed? 
Id at 4. 
Issue Number Three: Did the trial court err in certifying its 
ruling as to Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action (Quiet 
Title/Declaratory Relief Against Archer - Failure of 
Delivery) as a final judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) 
when the trial court failed to delineate a lack of factual 
overlap between the Second Cause of Action and the 
remaining causes of action and where a ruling on the 
remaining causes of action, including the Ninth Cause of 
Action for Adverse Possession, in the trial court would moot 
the issue on appeal? 
Id at 6. 
29. On December 10, 2008, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the matter to 
the Utah Court of Appeals Court for consideration. (R. at 727.) 
30. On January 12, 2009, the Utah Court of Appeals filed a Sua Sponte Motion 
for Summary Disposition and invited each of the parties to file a memorandum 
explaining why summary disposition should or should not be granted by the court. 
31. On January 28, 2009, Archer filed a Response to Sua Sponte Motion for 
Summary Disposition, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum B. Archer 
argued therein that the district court's certification under Rule 54(b) was reviewable and 
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the district court's Rule 54(b) certification was incorrect. (See Resp. to Sua Sponte Mot. 
for Summ. Disposition at 6-9.) 
32. On the same day, Clark filed a Memorandum in Support of Sua Sponte 
Motion for Summary Disposition. 
33. On February 20, 2009, the Utah Court of Appeals filed a Memorandum 
Decision, issued per curiam, dismissing Archer's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. (R. at 
742.) 
34. On or about March 18, 2009, Archer filed an Ex Parte Motion for 
Extension of Time to File Defendant and Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
pursuant to which he requested thirty additional days to file a petition for writ of 
certiorari. The motion was granted. Thereafter, Archer filed his petition on April 20, 
2009, one day after the deadline had passed. (R. at 751.) 
35. On July 28, 2009, this Court issued an Order granting Archer's petition for 
writ of certiorari as to the following issue: 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it lacked 
jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's appeal and that Petitioner 
had waived the opportunity to challenge the propriety of a 
rule 54(b) certification in connection with his appeal. 
(R. at 751.) 
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IV. Summary of Argument 
Archer's opening brief raises, for the first time during the entirety of this case, an 
argument that his Interlocutory Petition should have been considered sufficient under this 
Court's decision in Cedar Surgery Center, L.L.C. v. Bonelli. 2004 UT 58, 96 P.3d 911 
(Utah 2004), which holds that the only jurisdictional requirement for appealing a final 
judgment is timeliness. When the Court of Appeals denied Archer's Interlocutory 
Petition on April 25, 2008, the only way for Archer to preserve his appeal of the district 
court's Final Judgment of March 10, 2008, was to file a petition for certiorari on or 
before May 25, 2008. Instead, Archer never challenged the denial of his Interlocutory 
Petition before citing Bonelli in his opening brief to this Court. Accordingly, the Court 
lacks jurisdiction to consider any challenge to the Final Judgment. Even if the Court had 
jurisdiction, however, Archer has abandoned and necessarily waived the Bonelli 
argument by failing to raise it until filing his opening brief. 
Since Archer failed to preserve his appeal of the Final Judgment, his argument 
regarding the propriety of the district court's Rule 54(b) certification is irrelevant for 
purposes of this Court's review on certiorari. Even if Archer had properly preserved his 
appeal, however, his challenge regarding certification would fail, since the district court 
carefully and deliberately certified the Final Judgment under Rule 54(b) in accordance 
with Utah law and procedure. 
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V. Argument 
A. EVEN IF ARCHER HAD A VALID ARGUMENT UNDER BONELLI, 
ARCHER DEPRIVED THE COURT OF JURISDICTION BY FAILING TO 
CHALLENGE THE DENIAL OF HIS INTERLOCUTORY PETITION 
WITHIN THIRTY DAYS. 
Archer's primary argument centers on this Court's decision in Cedar Surgery 
Center, L.L.C. v. Bonelli 2004 UT 58, 96 P.3d 911 (Utah 2004) (hereinafter "Bonelli"). 
(See Br. of Appellant at 7-10.) Essentially, Archer's position is that his Interlocutory 
Petition satisfied the requirements of Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
even if the Rule 54(b) certification was proper, since "'the timely filing of a notice of 
appeal is the only jurisdictional step' implicated under rule 3(a)." Bonelli, 2004 UT 58 f^ 
10, 96 P.3d at 913. Relying on Bonelli, Archer argues that his "Petition for Interlocutory 
Appeal was sufficient to preserve Archer's appeal rights regardless of whether the 54(b) 
certification was proper." (Br. of Appellant at 10.) In making this argument, Archer 
states that he "filed his Petition for Interlocutory Appeal within the time constraints of 
Rules 4 and 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." Id. at 9. In fact, Archer's 
Interlocutory Petition was filed one day beyond the twenty-day deadline established 
pursuant to Rule 5 for interlocutory appeals, but within the thirty-day deadline 
established under Rule 4. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a), 5(a). 
If Archer believed that his Interlocutory Petition constituted sufficient notice of 
appeal under Bonelli, he should have petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari in the 
manner established by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The merits of the Bonelli 
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argument are of no moment now, more than a year and a half later, since Archer failed to 
challenge the denial within the time period required under Utah law. 
If Archer believed he had a valid argument under Bonelh, Archer should have 
petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari no later than May 25, 2008, thirty days after 
the Court of Appeals denied the Interlocutory Petition. See Utah R. App. P. 48(a). By 
failing to challenge the Court of Appeals' denial of the Interlocutory Petition within thirty 
days, Archer deprived this Court of jurisdiction to consider it at all. See, e.g., Earle v. 
Warden, 811 P.2d 180, 180-81 (Utah 1991) ("This court does not have jurisdiction to 
hear a case in which the petition for certiorari is not timely filed."). 
The only way Archer could have preserved his ability to challenge the merits of 
the district court's Final Judgment of March 10, 2008, was through a proper and timely 
appeal of that judgment. As noted above, if Archer had desired to argue that his 
Interlocutory Petition was in fact sufficient under Bonelli, he was required to appeal the 
Court of Appeals' denial of his Interlocutory Petition within thirty days. By failing to 
challenge the denial by seeking a writ of certiorari within thirty days, Archer failed to 
preserve his right of appeal with respect to any portion of the district court's Final 
Judgment of March 10, 2008. Accordingly, the Utah Court of Appeals was correct in 
dismissing Archer's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
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B. EVEN IF THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER ARCHER'S 
ARGUMENT UNDER BONELLL ARCHER WAIVED THE ARGUMENT 
BY FAILING TO RAISE IT AT ANY TIME BEFORE FILING HIS 
OPENING BRIEF. 
Even if the Court still had jurisdiction over Archer's appeal, Archer waived the 
Bonelli argument by failing to raise it until now. Until filing his opening brief in this 
appeal, Archer had never once asserted his theory that under Bonelli his Interlocutory 
Petition constituted sufficient notice of appeal to satisfy the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. He did not raise it in his November 24, 2008 appeal of the district court's 
order dismissing all remaining claims in the case. (Indeed, Archer's Docketing Statement 
in that appeal made it clear that he was only challenging the rulings contained in the 
district court's decision entered on October 31, 2008). He did not raise it in his 
opposition to the Court of Appeals' sua sponte motion for summary disposition of that 
appeal. He did not even make the argument in his petition for certiorari. Indeed, at no 
time prior to the filing of his opening brief before this Court did Archer ever so much as 
cite the Bonelli case in his pleadings, briefs or any case filings. Accordingly, the decision 
of the Court of Appeals dismissing Archer's November 24, 2008 appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction did not consider Bonelli and was rendered on entirely different grounds. 
While it is appropriate for this Court to affirm the Court of Appeals' decision 
below on any grounds at all, see Bailey v. Bavles, 2002 UT 58^10, 52 P.3d 1158, 1161 
(Utah 2002), Clark respectfully asserts that Archer has waived the Bonelli argument by 
raising it for the first time in his opening brief. See, e.g.. Estate of Berkemeir ex rel. 
Nielsen v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest 2004 UT 104 f 10, 106 P.3d 700, 702 n.2 (Utah 
14 
2004); Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365, 
1371 n.ll (Utah 1996); see also, e.g.. 4 AmJur 2d, Appellate Review § 336 ("Questions 
not raised in the petition are deemed abandoned."). Accordingly, even if this Court had 
jurisdiction to consider the merits of Archer's Bonelli argument, it would not matter, 
because Archer waived his opportunity to make the central argument of his brief. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S 54(b) CERTIFICATION WAS PROPER AND WAS 
MADE AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF THE FORM OF THE 
FINAL JUDGMENT AND PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS THERETO. 
As described supra, Archer failed to preserve his right to appeal any aspect of the 
district court's Final Judgment of March 10, 2008 when he chose not to seek certiorari 
with respect to the Court of Appeals' denial of his Interlocutory Petition under Bonelli. 
Thus, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the district court's 
certification of the Final Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). Even if Archer had preserved 
his right of appeal, however, his challenge of the certification would fail, since the district 
court properly found, after due consideration, that the Final Judgment met the three-prong 
test for certification under Utah law and that there was no just cause for delay. 
After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Clark on the second 
cause of action of the amended complaint, Clark's counsel submitted a proposed form of 
judgment that included, consistent with the district court's ruling from the bench, a 
certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which was then 
circulated for review by all opposing counsel. Archer specifically objected to the Rule 
54(b) certification and submitted a proposed alternative form of judgment to the district 
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court. The district court convened a hearing for the sole purpose of addressing the form 
ofjudgment. 
In that hearing, the district court entertained argument from counsel for both sides 
before confirming that Clark's proposed judgment, including specifically the Rule 54(b) 
certification, accurately reflected the court's decision. Accordingly, the court signed 
Clark's proposed form ofjudgment, which became the Final Judgment entered on March 
10, 2008. The language of the Final Judgment was eminently clear regarding the issue of 
finality: 
Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the Court expressly finds that no just reason exists to delay 
the entry of a final judgment in this case and with respect to 
Clark's motion for summary judgment on the second cause of 
action of the amended complaint. Thus, this judgment is a 
final judgment on the second cause of action of the amended 
complaint in favor of Clark. The second cause of action is the 
only claim of the amended complaint to address the legal 
invalidity of Archer's warranty deed ab initio. In this regard, 
this claim stands alone and factually separate from the 
remaining claims of the amended complaint. Moreover, for 
this reason too, no just reason exists to delay the entry of this 
final judgment in favor of Clark to quiet title to the subject 
property, particularly given the advanced age of the plaintiffs. 
(R. at 462 \ 15 (emphasis added)). 
Due to the jurisdictional failure of Archer's Interlocutory Petition, the propriety of 
the district court's certification is not before the Court and, accordingly, is not addressed 
at length in this brief. Even if Archer had made a timely challenge to the certification, 
however, such challenge would fail, as the certification was proper under Utah law. 
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First, the underlying action as set forth in the amended complaint involved both 
multiple claims and multiple parties. See Weiser v. Union Pacific R.R., 932 P.2d 596, 
597 (Utah 1997) (citing Pate v. Marathon Steel Co.. 692 P.3d 765, 767 (Utah 1984)). 
Second, the Final Judgment on the second cause of action involved a "separate" 
claim, with distinct and non-overlapping facts, and the same would have been appealable 
but for the existence of remaining claims and parties. The Final Judgment was based on 
Clark's claim that there had been a failure of delivery. The district court, in ruling in 
Clark's favor, found that Clark had overcome the legal presumption of valid delivery and 
that the deed in question "was not supported by legal and effective delivery as required 
by law." (R. at 460.) As a result, the deed in question was void ab initio and was ordered 
stricken from the public record. (R. at 7.) Clark's successful claim regarding failure of 
delivery was the only claim raised in the amended complaint that could have resulted in a 
ruling that the deed in question was void ab initio. As such, it was factually distinct from 
each and every other claim, and the district court properly found that there was no 
"factual overlap" between the claim certified as final under Rule 54(b) and the remaining 
claims in the case. See Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 1099, 
1104-05 (Utah 1991). 
Third, the Final Judgment met the requirement of "finality" in that it ended the 
litigation on the merits and left nothing for the district court to do but execute the 
judgment See id at 1101 (citing Catlin v. United States. 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). 
Finally, the district court expressly found, based on the advanced age of the plaintiffs, 
that no just reason existed for delay in entering the judgment as final, thereby facilitating 
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expeditious resolution of the matter. Accordingly, the certification was proper under 
Utah law. 
Archer has consistently asserted that because he disagreed with the district court's 
certification of the Final Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), his only choice was to 
challenge the Final Judgment by means of a petition for interlocutory appeal: 
By seeking an interlocutory appeal, Defendant Archer 
maintained his position that certification was improper, and 
pursued the only option available . . . . Otherwise, Defendant 
Archer would be forced to avail himself of a rule that he 
beleived [sic] to be inapplicable. Through pursuing the 
appeal of the trial court's order as an interlocutory appeal, 
Defendant Archer placed the burden of defending the trial 
court's certification on the prevailing party in the trial court. 
(Br. of Appellant at 18-19.) Archer's argument, however, ignores the fact that the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly delineate the requisite procedure for appealing a 
judgment certified as final: 
A timely appeal from an order certified under Rule 54(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that the appellate court 
determines is not final may, in the discretion of the appellate 
court, be considered by the appellate court as a petition for 
permission to appeal an interlocutory order. 
Utah R. App. P. 5(a). Read in conjunction with Rules 3 and 4, the procedure mandated 
by Rule 5(a) becomes clear: If a party believes that a judgment certified as final under 
Rule 54(b) is not in fact final, that party should appeal the certification directly in an 
appeal as of right (pursuant to Rule 3) within thirty days (pursuant to Rule 4). If the 
appellate court agrees that the judgment is not in fact final, that court has the discretion to 
consider the appeal as a petition for interlocutory appeal. If the appellate court disagrees 
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and finds that the certification was in fact correct (as presumably would have been the 
case here if Archer had appealed in accordance with the procedure outlined by the rules 
instead of devising his own procedure), then the appellate court proceeds to consider the 
petitioner's appeal of the merits of the final order. This is the procedure established by 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The procedure described (and followed) by 
Archer fails to conform to the rules. 
VI. Conclusion 
For the reasons outlined above, Clark respectfully urges this Court to affirm the 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. Alternatively, Clark requests that the Court 
dismiss Archer's appeal for Jack of jurisdiction. 
DATED this JMJpL da^bf December, 2009. 
NELSON CHRISTENSEN HELSTEN 
HOLLINGWORTH & WILLIAMS 
ffery S. Williams 
K. Burton 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
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DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Trial Court No. 060601640 
Appellate Case No. 20081007 
Plaintiff/Appellant, through counsel, files this Docketing Statement pursuant 
to Rule 9 Utah R. App. P. 
1. Nature of the Proceeding. This appeal is from a final judgment 
by the Honorable Thomas L Kay of the Second Judicial District of the State 
of Utah. 
2. Jurisdiction. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(j). 
3. Relevant Dates. 
1 
a. Date the final judgment appealed from was entered: 
October 3 1 , 2008. 
b. Date the notice of appeal was filed: November 24, 2008. 
c. Date any motions filed pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. Rules 50(b), 
52(b), or 59, of Utah R. Crim. P., Rule 24: None Filed. 
4. Inmate mailbox rule. The appellant is NOT a confined inmate 
invoking Rule 4(f) 
5. Rule 54 (b ) . This appeal is NOT an appeal from an order in a 
multiple party or a multiple claim case in which the judgment has been 
certified as a final judgment by the trial court pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah 
R. Civ. P. 
6. Criminal cases. This is NOT a criminal case 
7. Issues on appeal. Appellant intends to assert the following issues 
on appeal: 
a. Issue Number One: As a preliminary jurisdictional question, 
did the trial court err in finding that Appellee's claim under the 
Second Cause of Action, Failure of Delivery, remained timely 
when Appellee failed to bring the cause of action for nine years 
after receiving notice that the claim was a valid cause of action? 
Determinative law: 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-309(2 ) : An action may be brought 
within six years: (2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability 
2 
founded upon an instrument in writing, except those mentioned in 
Section 78B-2-311. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-207: Actions or defenses founded upon 
title to real estate 
An action, defense, or counterclaim to an action based upon title to 
the property or entitlement to the rents or profits from the property 
shall be brought: 
(1) not later than seven years after the act on which it is based 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 B - 2 - 1 1 3 ( l ) ( b ) : Effect of payment, 
acknowledgment, or promise to pay 
(1) An action for recovery of a debt may be brought within the 
applicable statute of limitations from the date: 
(b) a written acknowledgment of the debt or a promise to pay is 
made by the debtor; 
Wells Fargo v. Temple View Investments> 82 P.3d 655 (Utah 
App. 2003) : 
In order to extend a deadline in a contract, there must be proof of 
mutual assent; otherwise the courts will not give "legal force to a 
party's attempt to unilaterally alter the terms of the note." at 657. 
In order for a signed writing to be used against the debtor, the 
writing must be "clear, distinct, direct, unqualified, and intentional.'7 
At 658. 
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State Bank v. Troy Hydro Sys., 894 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Utah 
App. 1995) : 
...the statutory exception for a promise, part payment, or 
acknowledgment does not extend the limitations period if the 
promise, payment, or acknowledgment occurs after the applicable 
statute of limitations has run. Instead, the statute would have its 
extending effect only if the appropriate act occurs before the 
otherwise applicable limitations period initially expires. 
Standard of Review: 
The district court's application of a statute of limitations is a 
question of law, which we review for correctness. Davis v. Provo 
City Corp., 193 P.3d 86 (Utah 2008). 
b. Issue Number Two: In the alternative, did the trial court err 
in granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment holding 
that Appellee had overcome the presumption of validity of a 
delivered deed when the only evidence presented to overcome 
the presumption was testimony of the grantor that he could not 
remember delivering the deed? 
Determinative Law: 
Baker v. Patteer 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984): 
A presumption of valid delivery arises where the deed has been 
executed and recorded, Kresser v. Peterson, Utah, 675 P.2d 1193 
4 
(1984); Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, supra, but such 
a presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing 
evidence to the contrary. Gold Oil Land Development Corp. v. 
Davis, Utah, 611 P.2d 711 (1980). 
The recording of a deed and placing the names of others 
on the property is somewhat in the nature of a public 
declaration that [the grantor] intended the instrument to 
become effective immediately. People as a rule do not 
deliberately put a flaw in the title to their property, thereby 
handicapping its later disposal, unless they really intend to 
transfer some interest to the person whose name is thus 
placed in the record. 
Allen v. Alien, 115 Utah 303, 204 P.2d 458 (1949). 
Standard of Review: 
A party attacking the validity of a written instrument must do so by 
clear and convincing evidence. Pagano v. Walker, Utah, 539 P.2d 
452 (1975) 
In reviewing a grant or denial of summary judgment, the court of 
appeals was obligated to "view the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party" and to review the district court's legal 
conclusions, as well as the grant of summary judgment as a whole, 
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for correctness. Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, PP2, 
10, 100 P.3d 1200 (citation omitted). Summary judgment is 
appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. P10; 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). View Condo. Owners Ass'n v. MSICO, LLC, 
127 P.3d 697 (Utah 2005) 
c. Issue Number Three: Did the trial court err in certifying its 
ruling as to Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action (Quiet 
Title/Declaratory Relief Against Archer - Failure of Delivery) as a 
final judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) when the trial court 
failed to delineate a lack of factual overlap between the Second 
Cause of Action and the remaining causes of action and where a 
ruling on the remaining causes of action, including the Ninth 
Cause of Action for Adverse Possession, in the trial court would 
moot the issue on appeal? 
Determinative Law: 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54 (b ) : Judgment upon multiple claims and/or 
involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, 
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the 
entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of 
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the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the 
court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such 
determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, 
however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or 
the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not 
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the 
order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time 
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
Kuhre v. Good fellow, 69 P.3d 286 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) : 
"The initial question of whether an order is eligible for certification 
under rule 54(b) . . . is a question of law." Kennecott Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 1991). "Rule 54(b) 
of the civil rules permits the trial court to certify certain 
interlocutory orders and, by so doing, force the appellate court to 
entertain the appeal." Id.; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). In 
determining whether a trial court's rule 54(b) certification is proper, 
we f,1focus[] on the degree of factual overlap between the issues 
certified for appeal and the issues remaining in the district court.1" 
Kennecott, 814 P.2d at 1103 (quoting Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. 
v. American Cyanamid Co., 860 F.2d 1441, 1445 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
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"When this factual overlap is such that separate claims appear to 
be based on the same operative facts or on the same operative 
facts with minor variations, they are held not to constitute separate 
claims for rule 54(b) purposes." Id.; see also FMA Leasing Co. v. 
Citizens Bank, 823 P.2d 1065, 1066 (Utah 1992)." 
Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137 (Utah 1992) : 
'Today we hold that a claim is not separate if a decision on claims 
remaining below would moot the issues on appeal." at 138 
v In order to facilitate this court's review of judgments certified as 
final under rule 54(b), trial courts should henceforth enter findings 
supporting the conclusion that such orders are final. The findings 
should explain the lack of factual overlap between the certified and 
remaining claims and thus satisfy the Kennecott criterion for 
certification to be proper." at 139 
Weiser v. Union Pac. R.R., 932 P.2d 596 (Utah 1997) : 
A trial court ruled that a railroad company's claim of title to a 
certain tract of land failed due to lack of condition. The trial court 
certified the ruling under Rule 54(b). The Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
MHere we have one claim—ownership of the disputed l a n d -
supported by different legal theories. 
'The trial court stated that the issue of the validity of the land grant 
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was a core dispositive issue, because a decision in Union Pacific's 
favor would moot the other claims and render further proceedings 
unnecessary. Therefore, there was "no just reason to delay 
directing entry of final judgment." While it may be true that if we 
were to find that Union Pacific prevails under the grant, Weiser's 
other arguments would be irrelevant, the trial court failed to 
consider the opposite case. x If Union Pacific were to lose on appeal 
on the land-grant issue, it could pursue its claim under one of the 
reserved theories of law and/or equity, resulting in a piecemeal 
appeal. We held in Bennfon v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137, 138 
(Utah 1992), that "a claim is not separate if a decision on claims 
remaining below would moot the issues on appeal." Here, a ruling 
that Union Pacific owns the disputed land under, for example, 
adverse possession would moot the appeal now before us. Thus, to 
hear this case in its present form would be to risk a waste of 
judicial resources." 
Standard of Reviews 
We review questions of law for correctness, giving no deference to 
the ruling of the court below. R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., 100 P.3d 1159 (Utah 2004) 
8. Factual summary: 
This case involves an experienced developer, Dale Clark ("Clark"), who 
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brought suit against Mark Archer ("Archer") nine years after he conveyed 
title to 8 acres of land to Archer seeking a return of the land. On or about 
September 26, 1997, Clark and Archer entered into an Earnest Money and 
Real Estate Sales Agreement. Clark agreed to sell to Archer the Syracuse 
Meadows Property for the purchase price of Three-Hundred Sixty-Two 
Thousand Seven Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($362,700.00). 
The Earnest Money Contract stated that Clark was to finance the 
purchase of the Syracuse Meadows Property and that Archer would secure 
that financing with a Note and a Trust Deed. Archer was to develop the land 
into thirteen (13) lots and to make thirteen (13) installment payments of 
$27,900.00 as each lot sold. 
Clark agreed to convey the Syracuse Meadows Property by Warranty 
Deed at closing of the sale. On November 14, 1997, Clark executed a 
Warranty Deed whereby he conveyed the land to Archer. On November 19, 
1997, Bonneville Title Company, Inc., the escrow agent, recorded the 
Warranty Deed with the Davis County Recorder's Office. 
To secure the purchase of the property, Archer executed a Trust Deed 
and a Trust Deed Note. The Trust Deed Note required Archer to render 
payment in the amount of $362,700.00 plus applicable interest, "on or before 
April 27, 1998." Archer executed both instruments on November 14, 1997, 
and Bonneville Title Company recorded the Trust Deed on November 19, 
1997 with the Davis County Recorder's Office. The Trust Deed was executed 
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with Archer as Trustor, Bonneville Title Company, Inc as Trustee and 
Bonneville Exchange, LLC as intermediary for Dale D. Clark and Ruth E. Clark 
as beneficiary. 
As Archer began to develop the land, he learned that there were runoff 
and drainage problems on the surrounding land that prevented him from 
gaining final approval for the subdivision. Archer learned that Clark owned 
the surrounding land. Archer attempted to work with Clark in order to repair 
the deficiencies of the surrounding land in order to develop the subdivision. 
Clark proved unwilling to assist and, after Archer expended great time, 
money, and energy in his attempts, Archer was unable to pursue the 
development further. Archer was unable to sell any lots and did not the 
amount due under the Trust Deed Note by April 27,1998. 
On May 2 1 , 1998, 180 days after the Warranty Deed and the Trust 
Deed had been recorded, Bonneville Title Company, Inc. executed an 
Assignment of Trust Deed. The Assignment of Trust Deed was then recorded 
on May 22, 1998 and the instrument was mailed to Dale D. Clark and Ruth E. 
Clark at their address in Bountiful, Utah. 
On May 15, 2006, Clark filed a complaint in the Second Judicial District 
in the State of Utah. The Complaint was then amended on September 8, 
2006. Clark asserted fifteen (15) causes of action against Archer, Bonneville 
Title Company, Inc, and Bonneville Exchange, LLC. 
On April 26, 2007, Clark filed, through counsel, a Motion for Summary 
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Judgment on his Second and Ninth Causes of Action. Archer opposed the 
motion and filed a counter motion for summary judgment on the same 
causes of action. The parties briefed the two motions and Judge Thomas L 
Kay heard oral argument on September 24, 2007. 
On October 15, 2007, Judge Kay entered his initial ruling on the cross 
motions for summary judgment denying all motions. Judge Kay ruled that 
the statute of limitations might have run subject to a potential application of 
the discovery rule. Judge Kay stated: 
The record on this issue [the application of the discovery rule to 
the underlying facts] is lacking, however, and the Court will 
require additional briefing on it before a decision can be reached 
which grants either party's motion. Accordingly, both Motions 
for Summary Judgment on Clark's Second Cause of Action are 
denied. If the parties wish to submit an additional motion 
addressing the statute of limitations and the application of the 
discovery rule they may. 
See Ruling on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, Case No. 060601640 
attached hereto as Attachment A. 
The parties each submitted supplemental briefing on the discovery 
rule. Clark exceeded the scope of the supplemental briefing and briefed the 
issue of whether Archer's Affidavit, attached to Archer's Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the Second and Ninth Causes of Action, acted as an 
acknowledgment of an existing debt under Utah Code Ann. §78-12-44 (now 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-113(l)(b). Judge Kay heard oral arguments on the 
issue of the discovery rule and, heard Clark's argument regarding the 
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application of Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-113(l)(b). 
After oral argument, Judge-Kay ruled from the bench granting Clark's 
motion for summary judgment stating that the parties had agreed to toll the 
statute of limitations. Judge Kay relied on a statement made by affidavit 
filed by Archer in support of his motion for summary judgment. In his 
affidavit, Archer stated " I reached an oral agreement with Clark wherein it 
was agreed that their written agreement would be tolled until other phase 
problems were in compliance with drainage through Phase 6 (which still is 
not complete) and interest would be tolled as well with lots sold and payment 
released at $27,900.00 per lot plus my efforts to assist would be deducted 
against the note amount of $362,700.00." 
In his written ruling dated March 10, 2008, Judge Kay granted Clark's 
motion for summary judgment stating that Clark had overcome the 
presumption of validity of a recorded deed by clear and convincing evidence. 
Judge Kay further stated that the "discovery rule" was inapplicable given 
Archer's statement in his affidavit regarding the tolling of the agreement. 
Judge Kay ruled that Archer's testimony renders the second cause of action 
timely under the terms of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-44. Judge Kay found that 
"Having agreed and represented to the Court to the existence of a "tolling" 
understanding between the parties, Archer is precluded under Utah statutory 
law and otherwise from claiming that Clark's second cause of action for 
failure of delivery has now expired." Judge Kay continued, "Archer cannot, in 
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a sworn Affidavit submitted in opposition to a summary judgment motion, 
claim that a "toll ing" agreement exists between the parties, but then assert, 
contrary to that representation, that Clark's rights have nevertheless 
expired/' 
Judge Kay then certified this ruling as a final judgment under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 54(b). 
Archer filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal on March 31 , 2008. 
Clark opposed the Petition on March 15, 2004, arguing that, as per the Rule 
54(b) certification, the matter was not appealable as an interlocutory appeal. 
The Court of Appeals denied the Petition on April 24, 2008. 
Clark then moved the trial court to dismiss all remaining causes of 
action without prejudice. Archer moved the trial court for permission to file a 
counterclaim and cross-claim. On September 23, 2008, the trial court heard 
oral argument on the two motions. On November 10, 2008, the trial court 
issued a written order granting Clark's motion to dismiss the remaining 
causes of action without prejudice and denying Archer's motion to file a 
counterclaim and cross claim. 
Archer now appeals the trial court's ruling on the Second Cause of 
Action. 
9. Assignment. This appeal is subject to assignment by the 
Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-
102(4) and Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j). However, the Utah Supreme 
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Court should not assign this matter to the Court of Appeals as it involves an 
important issue that has yet to be ruled on by this Court. 
As demonstrated above, the Utah Court of Appeals has heard and 
ruled on cases involving the application of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-113(l)(b) 
as a "saving clause" for an action barred by the statute of limitations. The 
Court of Appeals has determined that in order for the statute to apply, the 
statement "resurrecting" a debt must be clear, distinct, unqualified, and 
intentional. Welts Fargo v. Temple View Investments, 82 P.3d 655 (Utah 
App. 2003). The Court of Appeals has also determined that "the statutory 
exception for a promise, part payment, or acknowledgment does not extend 
the limitations period if the promise, payment, or acknowledgment occurs 
after the applicable statute of limitations has run. Instead, the statute would 
have its extending effect only if the appropriate act occurs before the 
otherwise applicable limitations period initially expires." State Bank v. Troy 
Hydro Sys., 894 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Utah App. 1995). 
In spite of these clear rulings, the trial court failed to apply these 
appropriate standards. The Supreme Court should retain this matter so as to 
clearly identify the terms under which a party may "resurrect" a debt. 
10. Related Appeals. Appellant filed a Petition for Interlocutory 
Appeal with this Court on March 3 1 , 2008. Appellee opposed the Petition on 
April 15, 2008. The Court of Appeals denied the Petition on April 24, 2008. 
11. Attachments. The following are attached: 
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a. Attachment A: The final judgment from which the appeal is 
taken entered by the trial court on November 10, 2008. 
b. Attachment B: The trial court's ruling titled Final Judgment on 
Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action entered March 10, 2008. 
c. Attachment C: The trial court's ruling titled Ruling on Cross 
Motions for Summary Judgment entered October 15, 2007. 
d. Attachment D: The Notice of Appeal filed on November 24, 
2008. 
e. Attachment E: The Notice of Filing Petition for Appeal, filed on 
March 31 , 2008. 
f. Attachment F: Order from the Utah Court of Appeals denying 
Appellant's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal, dated April 25, 
2008. ^ 
DATED and signed this / ' day of December 2008. 
B^Ray Zoll, i f j I 
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant 
16 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
DOCKETING STATEMENT postage prepaid, to: 
Jeffery S. Williams 
NELSON CHRISTENSEN HELSTEN 
HOLLINGWORTH &. WILLIAMS 
68 South Main Street, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Stephen F. Noel 
SMITH KNOWLES PC 
4723 Harrison Blvd, Suite 200 
Ogden, UT 84403 
iisl^ > d on this l^day of December 2008. 
YtAM\)]lmJZHA/ 
ADDENDUM "B" 
B. Ray Zoll, #3607 
Micah R. Bruner, #11272 
8941 South 700 East, Suite 204 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: 801-545-7663 
Facsimile: 801-545-7910 
Email: ray@ztlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JAMES D. CLARK, in his capacity as 
Personal Representative for the 
ESTATE OF DALE D. CLARK, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
MARK B. ARCHER, an individual, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONSE TO THE SUA SPONTE 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
Trial Court No. 060601640 
Appellate Case No. 20081007 
Defendant/Appellant Mark B. Archer ("Archer"), through counsel, files this 
Response to the Court's Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition. The 
Court raises this motion for the purpose of determining whether this Court 
has jurisdiction after the trial court attempted to certify a ruling on the 
Second Cause of Action as final under Rule 54(b) on March 10, 2008. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case comes before the Court on appeal from the trial court's final 
adjudication dismissing Plaintiff/Appellee (Clark)'s remaining causes of action 
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after the court granted Clark's motion for summary judgment on one of his 
causes of action. The underlying dispute revolves around ownership of a 
particular tract of land located in Syracuse, Utah. A more complete recitation 
of the underlying facts has been submitted to the Court in Archer's Docketing 
Statement. To conserve the limited space for this brief, Archer directs the 
Court's attention to that recitation. For the purposes of this motion, 
however, it is imperative to point out that Clark's claim revolves solely 
around the ownership of that particular tract of land. 
In brief, Clark and Archer entered into an agreement whereby Clark 
agreed to sell Phase 6 of the Syracuse Meadows Development to Archer. 
Clark deeded the property to Archer and Archer set to work to develop the 
land into thirteen (13) lots for a subdivision to be built. Due to problems 
existing on the surrounding phases of the Development that were still owned 
by Clark, Archer was unable to develop the land as contemplated. Clark 
made no effort whatsoever to seek a return of the land after Archer allegedly 
defaulted under the terms of the sales agreement. 
On May 15, 2006, Clark filed a complaint in the Second Judicial District 
in the State of Utah seeking a return of the land and a nullification of the 
Warranty Deed whereby he granted the land to Archer. The Complaint was 
then amended on September 8, 2006. Clark asserted fifteen (15) causes of 
action against Archer, Bonneville Title Company, Inc, and Bonneville 
Exchange, LLC. Of the fifteen (15) causes of action, only eleven (11) applied 
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to Archer. These legal theories were 1) Declaratory Relief - Equitable Tolling 
Against Archer & Bonneville, 2) Quiet Title/Declaratory Relief Against Archer 
- Failure of Delivery, 3) Equitable Estoppel Against Archer, 4) Breach of 
Contract Against Archer - Earnest Money Contract, 5) Breach of Contract 
Against Archer - Note, 6) Declaratory/Damage Relief Against Archer -
Constructive Trust, 7) Declaratory Relief Against Archer - Trust Deed Valid, 
8) Breach of Fiduciary and Joint Venture Obligations Against Archer, 9) Quiet 
Title/Declaratory Relief Against Archer - Adverse Possession, 10) Foreclosure 
of Equitable Lien Against Archer, and 11) Unjust Enrichment Against Archer. 
The parties are before this Court on the trial court's ruling on Clark's 
Second Cause of Action (Failure of Delivery). The parties originally each 
moved for summary judgment on Clark's Second Cause of Action and Ninth 
Cause of Action in April 2007. The trial court heard very little in the way of 
argument concerning the Ninth Cause of Action (Adverse Possession) and the 
issues surrounding that cause of action were never ruled on. 
The argument centered generally on Archer's assertion that Clark's 
claims were time barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court 
determined that the statute of limitations might have run but denied both 
motions for summary judgment on the basis that the Discovery Rule may 
have tolled the statute of limitations. The parties submitted additional 
briefing to the court on whether the Discovery Rule applied to this situation 
and the parties again argued whether the Discovery Rule had tolled the 
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statute of limitations. Clark argued a new position that Archer's affidavit 
had, in some way, tolled the statute of limitations. The court, instead of 
ruling on the application of the Discovery Rule as anticipated, instead found 
that Archer's affidavit had tolled the statute of limitations and granted Clark's 
motion for summary judgment on the Failure of Delivery claim. Such ruling 
is clearly legally erroneous. 
Clark subsequently moved to dismiss all remaining causes of action 
and the trial court entered a final judgment on the entirety of the case. 
RULE 54f bl CERTIFICATION 
Upon granting Clark's motion for summary judgment, Judge Kay 
signed an order that had been proffered by Clark over Archer's objections. 
The signed order purported to enter a "Final Judgment" and the trial court 
included language necessary to certify the judgment as a final adjudication 
on the Second Cause of Action. Archer petitioned this Court to hear the 
appeal as an interlocutory appeal. The petition was denied. 
The trial court's certification of its ruling on the Second Cause of action 
was improper given the remaining causes of action in Clark's Complaint. 
Rule 54f bl 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) allows a trial court to force an appellate court to 
hear an interlocutory order. Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 
P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 1991). The Rule states: 
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When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, 
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may 
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer 
than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay 
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Utah Supreme Court has delineated three criteria 
necessary for a judgment to be certified under the Rule. 
First, there must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties 
to the action. Second, the judgment appealed from must have 
been entered on an order that would be appealable but for the 
fact that other claims or parties remain in the action. Third, the 
trial court, in its discretion, must make a determination that 
'there is no just reason for delay' of the appeal. 
Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1984). 
However, the Rule continues: 
In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or 
other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates 
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer 
than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of 
the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is 
subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties. 
Therefore, if the trial court does not make a certification on an 
interlocutory order, or if that certification is improper, then the ruling 
is only subject to review by the appellate courts on a petition for 
interlocutory appeal until the entire case is resolved. Once the entire 
case is resolved, then the party seeking appeal may seek an appeal as 
of right. 
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Rule 54 fb l Certification is Reviewable 
Although the trial court issued a certified "final" judgment, and used 
the Pate language that there is "no just reason for delay" in its attempt to 
effectuate a "final" judgment, this alone does not prevent this Court from 
reviewing the propriety of the certification. In general, the cases wherein the 
trial court's certification under Rule 54(b) is reviewed focus on the second of 
the Pate criteria - whether the issue certified is "appealable but for the fact 
that other claims or parties remain in the action." The issue rests in the 
underlying premise that "interlocutory appeals should be avoided because 
they present appellate courts with multiple appeals involving narrow issues 
taken out of the context of the whole case which slow down the final 
determination of the matter." Kennecott, 814 P.2d at 1101. Rule 54(b) 
certification, then is reserved for those cases wherein the "degree of factual 
overlap between the issues certified for appeal and the issues remaining in 
the district court" is such that the issues certified for appeal can be found to 
be "separate claims." Id. at 1100 (quoting Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. 
American Cyanamid Co., 860 F.2d 1441, 1445 (7th Cir. 1988)). "The initial 
question of whether an order is eligible for certification under rule 54(b)...is a 
question of law." Kennecott Corp., 814 P.2d 1100. When reviewing 
questions of law, the Utah appellate courts review the trial court's ruling "for 
correctness, giving no deference to the ruling of the court below." R.A. 
6 
McKell Excavating, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 100 P.3d 1159 (Utah 
2004). 
Judge Kav's Certification was Incorrect 
In this case, the degree of factual overlap between the issue certified 
for appeal, Clark's Second Cause of Action (Failure of Delivery), and the 
remaining causes of action was too great for certification to be proper. 
"When this factual overlap is such that separate claims appear to be based 
on the same operative facts or on the same operative facts with minor 
variations, they are held not to constitute separate claims for rule 54(b) 
purposes." Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 69 P.3d 286, 289 (Utah Ct; App. 2003); see 
also FMA Leasing Co. v. Citizens Bank, 823 P.2d 1065, 1066 (Utah 1992)." 
" [ I ] t is inappropriate to place an emphasis on a variation of specific facts 
needed to prove a claim, ... while ignoring the factual overlap of the 
overriding operative facts/ ' Id. citing Weiser v. Union Pac. R.R., 932 P.2d 596 
(Utah 1997). 
Further, "a claim is not separate if a decision on claims remaining 
below would moot the issues on appeal. Bennion v. Pennzoil Co.t 826 P.2d 
137, 138 (Utah 1992). The Court, in Bennion, went on to explain that a trial 
court's findings "should explain the lack of factual overlap between the 
certified and remaining claims and thus satisfy the Kennecott criterion for 
certification to be proper." Id. at 139. 
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In this case, Judge Kay failed to outline how the underlying facts of the 
Second Cause of Action were unrelated to the underlying facts on the 
remaining causes of action. At the heart of this matter is the disputed 
ownership of a certain tract of land. The land was deeded to Archer and, 
nearly ten years after the land was deeded, Clark filed an action to 
recuperate the land. Each of the underlying causes of action rest on the 
same claim - ownership of the disputed land. Clark has sought to prove 
ownership through fifteen (15) different legal theories, but all theories are 
aimed at solving the single claim - ownership. 
This case is nearly identical to the Utah Supreme Court case of Weiser 
v. Union Pac. R.R., 932 P.2d 596 (1997). In Weiser, the parties disputed 
ownership of a particular tract of land. Weiser claimed ownership based on a 
land grant to a remote predecessor in the land from President Ulysses S. 
Grant. Union Pacific Railroad's claim rested on a right of way granted to its 
predecessor in interest, Utah Central Railroad. The trial court determined 
that the grant under which Union Pacific claimed its interest was conditioned 
on Utah Central Railroad filing with the Secretary of Interior "a map approved 
by him 'exhibiting the line of said company, as the same has been located 
and constructed' within three months of the grant/ ' Id. at 597. The trial 
court found that Utah Central Railroad had failed to meet this condition and 
ruled that Union Pacific's claim of title to the land failed due to lack of 
condition. The trial court then certified this ruling under Rule 54(b). 
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Upon review, the Utah Supreme Court determined that the Rule 54(b) 
certification was improper. The Court reasoned 
Here we have one claim—ownership of the disputed l a n d -
supported by different legal theories. The trial court stated that 
the issue of the validity of the land grant was a core dispositive 
issue, because a decision in Union Pacific's favor would moot the 
other claims and render further proceedings unnecessary. 
Therefore, there was "no just reason to delay directing entry of 
final judgment." While it may be true that if we were to find that 
Union Pacific prevails under the grant, Weiser's other arguments 
would be irrelevant, the trial court failed to consider the 
opposite case. If Union Pacific were to lose on appeal on the 
land-grant issue, it could pursue its claim under one of the 
reserved theories of law and/or equity, resulting in a piecemeal 
appeal. We held in Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137, 138 
(Utah 1992), that "a claim is not separate if a decision on claims 
remaining below would moot the issues on appeal." Here, a 
ruling that Union Pacific owns the disputed land under, for 
example, adverse possession would moot the appeal now before 
us. Thus, to hear this case in its present form would be to risk a 
waste of judicial resources. 
Similarly, in this matter, there is but one claim, that of ownership of the 
disputed land. While the failure of delivery claim is one theory under which 
Clark claims ownership, there remain subsequent theories under which he 
could pursue his ownership claim should he lose on appeal. 
For instance, if Archer had pursued the Second Cause of Action on 
appeal as certified, and had Clark lost on appeal (as the Docketing Statement 
demonstrates will almost assuredly happen), Clark could have then pursued 
his claim for ownership of the property under the theory of adverse 
possession. To pursue an appeal under a Rule 54(b) certification, then, 
would have resulted in a piecemeal appeal and a waste of judicial resources. 
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Therefore, the Rule 54(b) certification was improper and, after the petition 
for interlocutory appeal was denied, the only proper manner to appeal the 
ruling was to ensure the case was entirely resolved before seeking appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court failed to discuss whether the underlying facts to the 
Second Cause of Action overlapped with the underlying facts to the 
remaining fourteen (14) causes of action. Even if the trial court had entered 
into such a discussion, the facts of the case are simply too interrelated to 
allow for only one cause of action to be certified under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
There is but one claim at issue in this case, the ownership of the 
Syracuse Meadows property in spite of Clark's fifteen (15) legal theories. To 
certify a judgment on only one of these issues as final for purposes of appeal 
is improper as it leaves the possibility that, if the judgment is overturned, 
another theory may then be championed as the winning theory. 
Therefore, the trial court's attempt to certify its ruling on the Second 
Cause of Action (Failure of Delivery) under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) was 
improper and this matter is now properly before this Court. 
DATED and signed this _ZTday of January 2009. 
%. Ray Zoll, 
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant 
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